Introduction
Competition is important for efficiency in the production and allocation of goods and services. In banking, the level of competition has implications for access to finance, allocation of capital funds, competitiveness and development of manufacturing and service industries, levels of economic growth and the extent of financial stability. Competition can stimulate innovation, lower prices and increase the quality of products and services produced, which in turn enhances choice and welfare. The development of reliable and easily understandable indicators of competition is a highly relevant endeavour (Carbo et al, 2009) . Furthermore, an understanding of the underlying mechanisms that drive the evolution of competition is important to government agencies tasked with ensuring that competitive outcomes prevail.
The assessment of competition in the banking industry has a long empirical tradition (Casu and Girardone, 2006) . However, evidence related to bank competition in Africa is scarce.
The international evidence on competition presented in previous studies includes a small number of large African countries (Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Schaeck et al., 2009; and Turk-Ariss 2010) . Furthermore, most previous studies do not account for the political and institutional factors that are likely to shape competition in countries characterized by a variety of imperfections (caused by a lack of development, weak institutions, governance and barriers to entry). This paper contributes to the limited empirical literature on African banking, by focusing on the importance of globalization, governance and institutional quality in determining competition. The empirical analysis executed in two stages. In the first stage, we estimate the extent of competition in banking for 29 African countries during [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . In order to do so, we employ the Boone indicator which measures the impact of efficiency on performance (Boone, 2008) . The Boone indicator assumes that competition increases the performance of efficient banks and erodes the performance of inefficient counterparts. Thus, the Boone indicator is derived from estimating an model that explains performance based upon market structure and efficiency variables. 1 In the second stage, we conduct a multiple regression analysis to examine 3 whether globalization, governance and institutional quality enhance bank competition, and whether this impact is uniform across the banking industries in our sample. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the recent evolution of banking in Africa and discusses salient literature. In section 3 we present the estimable models, while section 4 discusses the data set and results. Section 5 concludes.
Our results suggest that bank competition in Africa increases

Background and Literature
This section provides a brief discussion of recent developments in banking in Africa. It also provides an overview of salient literature.
Banking in Africa
Financial development in Africa lags behind other areas of the world (Beck and Cull, 2014) . In 2011, credit to the private sector stood at an average of 78% of GDP (compared to 132.5% for other emerging markets in East Asia and Pacific). Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, the liquid liabilities of Sub-Saharan African (SSA) averaged banks hovered around 30%, while for other developing countries was around 4% (Allen et al, 2009 ). The lack of financial development is in itself a function of widespread poverty and large proportion of the population in many African countires being engaged in subsistence agriculture (Honohan and Beck 2007) .
Moreover, the large concentration of population in subsistence production limits the financial resources available for intermediation.
In the past three decades, governments in African countries have embarked on financial sector restructuring involving deregulation and a relaxation of entry barriers to foreign investment (Beck and Cull, 2014 
Literature review
Early research on competition focuses on market structure-performance linkages originating from the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm and the Chicago Revisionist School (Demsetz, 1973; Hannan, 1991) . The former contests that a small number of banks are able to collude either implicitly or explicitly, or use independent market power to charge higher prices (lower rates paid on deposits, higher rates charged on loans) so as to earn abnormal profits. The latter contested that finding evidence of a positive relationship between concentration (measured by the concentration ratio and the Herfindahl index) and profitability (or price cost margin) does 3 High minimum balance requirements for retail customers and annual fees for current accounts may explain why less than 20% of the population in many African countries have access to a bank account (Beck et al 2007).
5 not necessarily infer collusive behaviour as it may simply reflect the relationship between size and efficiency. 4 Larger banks gain from scale and other efficiency advantages; therefore more concentrated markets are inherently more profitable. The extent to which banks are able to earn high profits through the exercise of individual or collective market power, or as a consequence of superior efficiency, has never been satisfactorily resolved (Casu and Girardone, 2006; Goddard et al., 2007) .
Later research draws on contestable markets theory and its new empirical industrial organisation (NEIO) counterpart to emphasise the influence of potential as well as actual competition, and consequently focus on competitive conduct of firms in response to changes in demand and supply conditions. The mark-up test involves estimating a structural model incorporating demand and cost equations, together with the profit-maximizing condition marginal revenue equals marginal cost (Bresnahan, 1982; Lau, 1982) . The parameters of the model can be estimated using data either at industry level or at firm level, and can be used to derive an indication of the nature of a given firm's conjectural variation. This in turn indicates whether price-setting conduct by each firm is based on perfectly competitive, imperfectly competitive or assumptions. The Rosse-Panzar test is based on empirical observation of the impact on firm-level revenues of variations in the prices of the factors of production that are used as inputs in the production processes of a group of competing firms (Panzar and Rosse, 1987) .
Built into the test is an explicit assumption of profit-maximizing behaviour on the part of the firms. Rosse and Panzar show that the H-statistic, defined as sum of the elasticities of a firm's total revenue with respect to each of its factor input prices, differs under perfectly competitive, imperfectly competitive and monopolistic market conditions. The market is deemed a monopoly where the value of H-statistic is equal to or smaller than zero, a value between zero and one points to monopolistic types of competition, and a value of one indicates a perfect competitive market.
5
4 A traditional measure of profitability is the Price-Cost-Margin (PCM) which is frequently used in the empirical industrial organization literature as an approximation of the theoretical Lerner index. The index is derived from the monopolists profit maximization condition as price minus marginal cost divided by price. Monopolist profit is maximized when the Lerner index is equal to the inverse price elasticity of demand. Under perfect competition, the Lerner index is zero, and in monopoly it approaches one for positive marginal cost. . 5 This measure has been applied extensively to the banking systems in both static and dynamic frameworks (Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Goddard and Wilson, 2009) 6 Recent literature draws on the insights afforded by the SCP and NEIO literatures to assess the relationship between the elasticity of performance and marginal cost. The Boone (2008) indicator gauges the strength of the relation between efficiency (measured in terms of average or marginal cost) and performance (measured in terms of market share or profitability). In general, this indicator is based on the efficient hypothesis that associates performance with differences in efficiency. Under this hypothesis, more efficient banks (i.e. banks with lower marginal costs), achieve superior performance at the expense of their less efficient counterparts. As a consequence, there is a monotonic increase in the degree of competition when firms interact more aggressively and when entry barriers decline.
A number of studies suggest that industry structure and regulatory environment are important determinants of bank competition. Barth et al. (2004) find that tightening entry requirements reduces bank efficiency, which leads to higher net interest margin and overhead costs. Restrictions on foreign bank participation tend to an increase in financial instability. 
Methods
This section describes the empirical methods used in this paper. A two stage approach is employed. In stage one, the Boone indicator is used to measure bank competition in a given 6 Structural and institutional impediments are of particular importance to banks in developing countries. Globalization enhances competition; as it allows free entry and exit of foreign banks, integrates national economies, governance, and produces complex relations of mutual interdependence (Norris, 2000) . Globalization appears to propel economic growth in countries with stronger institutions and effective governance structures (Roa and Vadlamannati, 2011). 7 banking industry. In the second stage, the Boone indicator is used as the dependent variable in a dynamic panel model which seeks to explain the factors that influence bank competition.
Stage 1: Estimating the level of competition
The Boone indicator is based on the efficient structure hypothesis that links performance with differences in efficiency. This indicator suggests that increased competition (given some level of efficiency of each bank), leads to an increase in the market shares of more efficient banks in relation to less efficient counterparts. The estimable model is: s is regressed on the marginal cost to obtain information on how market share co-varies with costs. That is, efficiency gains lead to lower output prices, which in turn increase market shares. As marginal cost cannot be observed directly, the it mc is derived from the following trans-log cost function as:
it Cost is the bank's total costs including financial and operating cost; and it q represents a proxy for bank output measured as total assets. 1 W , 2 W and 3 W indicate the input price of deposit funds, labour and capital, and are calculated as the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits and money market funds, labour cost to total assets, and other operating expenses to total assets respectively. The cost function is estimated separately for each bank industry in the 8 sample. Once the cost function is estimated, its first derivative with respect to the output evaluated for each bank in the sample, is the marginal cost:
To allow for heterogeneity in the empirical model, a bank-specific effect is included to estimate the Boone indicator as:  is estimated separately for each year for each country reflecting changes in competition over time. Market share may reduce marginal cost due to the market power, therefore the influences on a bank's market power through higher market share could cause it to adjust its marginal cost. 7 It is expected that banks with low marginal cost gain market share (that is β <0). Competition thus tends to increase this effect as more efficient banks outperform less efficient ones. This implies that the more negative β is, the more intense competition is. However, in some cases a positive value for β is possible, implying that the higher a bank's marginal cost, the higher its market shares. This may arise if the market is characterised by collusion or because banks are competing on quality.
An endogeneity issue is likely to arise when estimating Equation (4) given that performance and cost are determined simultaneously. To correct this, a test is first conducted to examine whether endogeneity is present in the model specification. Table 1 also shows that overall the African country's least globalised country is Rwanda, followed by Sierra Leone and Sudan. As discussed below, wars, genocide and weak institutions have accounted for this phenomenon and affected their economic growth and development.
Insert table 1 here
A number of indices are used to assess institutional and political environments of selected African countries. The strength and quality of a country's institutions reflect the ability of policy authorities to identify various forms of anticompetitive conduct in banking and impose appropriate sanction where appropriate. We employ four indices obtained from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). This represents transparency (inverse of corruption) within the political system and the quality of the judicial system and the general observance of the law is 11 denoted by law quality. Corruption especially financial corruption makes financial markets less efficient by generating networking effects that lead to anticompetitive behaviour. We expect that in countries with high corruption (i.e. low transparency), competitive conditions tend to be very low, and this is more pronounced for large banks with greater political power. Our corruption variable captures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including petty and grand forms of corruption. Zimbabwe has the lowest score with regard to transparency index. Bureaucratic quality represents the quality of administrative infrastructure. The quality and relevance of laws enacted is denoted as the legislative quality. Higher values for these indices reflect higher institutional quality. The variables' transparency and the law quality range in value between zero and six, while the variables' bureaucratic quality and legislative strength range between zero and four. In our sample, Malawi has the lowest score with regards to legislative strength while Cote d'Ivoire is the least in terms of the quality of bureaucracy. Table 1 reports the summary statistics of globalization and institutional quality variables. We assume that banks view institutional quality as predetermined in that they observed the level of institutional strength and quality in the previous period and set their lending rates and overall strategy accordingly. This therefore means that a change in institutions today will affect the bank competition in the next period. Thus all the institutional variables in Equation (5) are lagged.
We employ a number of additional control variables which prior studies have shown to affect the level of bank competition (van Leuvensteijn et al, 2011; Delis, 2012; Amidu, 2013) .
For bank-level controls, the ratio of equity to total assets (bank equity) is used as a measure of the level of capitalization. The logarithm of total assets is employed as a proxy for bank size. Table 2 presents mean value of bank-specific variables of the selected banks. GDP growth, Inflation, and GDP per capita growth are included in the regression to account for differences in macroeconomic environments. GDP per capita growth is used to control for the general economic development. The banking system is less likely to be competitive when it is subject to high inflation, in that, prices of financial services such as interest rates will be less informative.
Accordingly we define Inflation as the rate of annual growth in the consumer price index (CPI).
Insert 
Results
Measurement of competition
We estimate Equation 4 in order to derive a Boone indicator for each banking industry in our sample. Banking industries are grouped on the basis of the regional location of the banks. Table 4 presents the regression results using the Boone indicator (a measure of competition) as the dependent variable. The columns in Table 4 relate to different empirical approaches to institutional quality and environments (Column 1 for transparency, column 2 for bureaucratic, column 3 for law quality and column 4 for legislative quality). In column (2), bureaucratic quality enters the regression with a positive and significant coefficient. However, these results are not uniform across banks in the sample as the level of economic development can reinforce the effect of bureaucratic quality on bank competition.
Determinants of competition
While the law quality (column 3) increases competition the reverse is the case of legislative strength (column 4) of African countries. Finally, column (5) is estimated employing all the institutional quality variables. The overall results suggest that bank competition is more intense in banking industries located in countries with stronger governance structures and institutional quality.
We now turn our attention to how competition is affected by globalization. The findings are presented in Table 5 and in columns similar to Table 4 . Column (1) is for overall globalization index, column (2), (3) and (4) implies that institutional quality enhances competition in a country of relatively higher economic development. The coefficient of legislative quality and that of globalization remained 16 All the countries in the Northern region as grouped in column (1) are either lower middle income or upper middle income.
unchanged. Thus, African countries are relatively less able to develop independent and wellresourced legislative bodies that promote competition among banks. The overall results point to the fact that African countries are less developed and less positioned to take full advantage of globalization.
Insert table 6 here
The sensitivity of competition to institutional quality and globalization
This subsection analyses the sensitivity of competition to the interaction of globalization and institutional quality on one hand and bank size on the other. Previous studies suggest that larger banks are efficient, access cheaper sources of finance and are cope better with issues of moral hazard associated with borrowers. These factors enable the banks to absorb the effects of institutional and competition policies. The results of the sensitivity analysis are presented in Table 7 . The results show that larger banks operating in Africa are less sensitive to institutional quality in promoting bank competition. This means that the institutional strength of a country is less effective in promoting competition especially when large banks are prevalent. Policy implications of this finding are: regulators and policy authorities must design anti-competition conduct in the banking sector and impose appropriate sanctions, bearing in mind bureaucracy and law quality available to supervise the rules and regulations. It is even more important when the level of economic development is considered. Table 8 on the other hand presents the results of the findings taking into consideration the level of development. Columns 1, 2 and 3 represent middle income, low income and the entire sample respectively. Here, the relationship between the indicator of competition and the interaction between bureaucratic quality and bank size is positive in column (2). This result indicates that the sensitivity of market power to bureaucratic quality increases as the size of the bank increases. Thus the bureaucrats are more effective at regulating and supervising competition in low-income than in the middle-income African countries. Similarly, the coefficient of the legal quality and globalization interaction with bank size is positive and significant among middle-income economies. On the whole, the results suggest that countries with better quality judicial systems reduce the sensitivity of their market power to bank size by more than 38 per cent.
Insert table 7 here
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Final Remarks
In the past three decades governments in African countries have embarked on a variety of financial sector reforms involving deregulation and a relaxation of entry barriers to foreign banks. Against this background, this paper examines the level and determinants of competition in African banking. A two stage approach is employed. In stage one, the Boone indicator is used to measure the extent of competition in a given country. In the second stage, the Boone indicator is used as the dependent variable in a dynamic panel model which seeks to explain the factors that influence bank competition in Africa. We find that globalisation and institutional quality enhance Table 1 shows the average of country-level variables on globalization index and instructional quality. Economic integration is characterised as long distance flows of goods, capital and services as well as information and perceptions that accompany markets exchanges. Political integration is characterised by a diffusion of government policies while social integration is expressed as the spread of ideas. Transparency presents (inverse of corruption) within the political system and the quality of the judicial system and the general observance of the law is denoted by law quality. Bureaucratic quality represents the quality of the selected countries bureaucracy. The quality of legislative organ of the governance represents the legislative strength. Table 2 presents the mean value of bank-specific variables of the selected banks. Revenue is measured as total income divided by total assets. Interest cost, price of labour and capital indicate the input price of deposit funds, labour and capital and these are respectively calculated as the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits and money market funds, labour cost to total assets, and other operating expenses to total. The bank size is the average total assets and bank equity represents average capitalization of respective countries' banks. The mean values of the selected banks over the period [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] Table 3 Estimates of bank competition using Boone method 
Globalization
Institution quality
Table 4 Determinants of bank competition with institutional quality
The dependent variable is the degree of competition which is proxied by the Boone indicator with more negative value showing higher competition. Bank size is proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets valued in US dollars. Banks' capitalization is the bank total equity to asset ratio, measured as equity as a percentage of total assets. Transparency presents (inverse of corruption) within the political system and the quality of the judicial system and the general observance of the law is denoted by law quality. Bureaucratic quality represents the quality of the selected countries bureaucracy. The quality of legislative organ of the governance represents the legislative strength. The GDP growth accounts for the differences in economic development across countries. Inflation is the rate of inflation based on the CPI. The parameters are estimated with the small sample adjusted standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Panel B reports diagnostic test: Sargan N*R 2 test are reported for overidentifying restrictions measures instruments exogeneity. The R2 measures the goodness of fit while the p-value of F-test measures the significance of identifying instruments. The Wu-Hausman F-test and Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi2 specification compare the difference between the IV and the OLS estimators. Bank and country fixed effects are excluded from the estimation.
Panel A Table 5 Determinants of bank competition using globalization index The dependent variable is the degree of competition which is proxied by the Boone indicator with more negative value showing higher competition. Bank size is proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets valued in US dollars. Banks' capitalization is the bank total equity to asset ratio, measured as equity as a percentage of total assets. Economic integration is characterised as long distance flows of goods, capital and services as well as information and perceptions that accompany markets exchanges. Political integration is characterised by a diffusion of government policies while social integration is expressed as the spread of ideas. The GDP growth accounts for the differences in economic development across countries. Inflation is the rate of inflation based on the CPI. The parameters are estimated with the small sample adjusted standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Panel B reports diagnostic test: Sargan N*R 2 test are reported for overidentifying restrictions measures instruments exogeneity. The R2 measures the goodness of fit while the p-value of F-test measures the significance of identifying instruments. The Wu-Hausman F-test and Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi2 specification compare the difference between the IV and the OLS estimators. Bank and country fixed effects are excluded from the estimation. Table 6 Determinants of competition: Regional analysis versus level of development The dependent variable is the degree of competition which is proxied by the Boone indicator with more negative value showing higher competition. Bank size is proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets valued in US dollars. Banks' capitalization is the bank total equity to asset ratio. Transparency presents (inverse of corruption) within the political system and the quality of the judicial system and the general observance of the law is denoted by law quality. Bureaucratic quality represents the quality of the selected countries bureaucracy. The quality of legislative organ of the governance represents the legislative strength. Economic integration is characterised as long distance flows of goods, capital and services as well as information and perceptions that accompany markets exchanges. Political integration is characterised by a diffusion of government policies while social integration is expressed as the spread of ideas. The GDP growth accounts for the differences in economic development across countries. Inflation is the rate of inflation based on the CPI. The parameters are estimated with the small sample adjusted standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Panel B reports diagnostic test: Sargan N*R 2 test are reported for overidentifying restrictions measures instruments exogeneity. The R2 measures the goodness of fit while the p-value of F-test measures the significance of identifying instruments. The Wu-Hausman F-test and Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi2 specification compare the difference between the IV and the OLS estimators. Bank and country fixed effects are excluded from the estimation.
Panel (A)
(1) Northern (2) Table 7 The sensitivity of competition to institutional quality and bank size
The dependent variable is the degree of competition which is proxied by the Boone indicator with more negative value showing higher competition. The indicator is regressed against Bank size is proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets, banks' capitalization, globalization index, Transparency, law quality, Bureaucratic quality, the quality of the legislature, GDP growth and inflation. These variables are interacted with bank size The GDP growth accounts for the differences in economic development across countries. Inflation is the rate of inflation based on the CPI. The parameters are estimated with the small sample adjusted standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) The dependent variable is the degree of competition, which is proxied by the Boone indicator. This is regressed against Bank size is proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets, banks' capitalization, globalization index, Transparency, law quality, Bureaucratic quality, the quality of the legislature, GDP growth and inflation. These variables are interacted with bank size The GDP growth accounts for the differences in economic development across countries. Inflation is the rate of inflation based on the CPI. The parameters are estimated with the small sample adjusted standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
(1) Middle-income countries 
